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RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE
David Blaikie and Diana Ginn
INTRODUCTION
Full, open, and civilized discourse amongcitizens is fundamental to the life of a liberaldemocracy. It seems trite to assert that nodiscourse should be prohibited or excluded simplybecause it is grounded in religious faith oremploys religious beliefs to justify a particularposition.  Yet there are those who contend that it1
is improper for citizens to use religious argumentswhen debating or deciding issues in the publicsquare,  that metaphorical arena where issues of2public policy are discussed and contested. In thisarticle we challenge this position, examining thevarious arguments that are put forward for keepingpublic discourse secular, arguments that whencitizens explicitly ground their social and politicalviews in their religious beliefs, this is divisive,exclusionary, and ultimately antithetical to theliberal democratic state. We maintain that none ofthese arguments are persuasive.3  W e realize that we cannot do full justice in an article of this1 length to the issues that we raise here. W e see this article asallowing us to provide an introduction to and overview of thetopic and to organize our thoughts around some of the keypoints. W e will then explore these issues in greater depth, as iswarranted by their complexity, in our future work. The focus ofour article is not simply “the bases on which citizens rely inmaking political choices but also the bases on which citizensmay and should rely in justifying political choices.” M ichael J.Perry, Love and Power: The Role of Religion and Morality inAmerican Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991)at 17 [Perry, Love and Power]. Our references in this article areprimarily to Christianity or, some-times, the combined Judeo-Christian tradition. There are two reasons for this focus. First,where we refer to religious influences on the development ofthe Western legal tradition, it is accurate to focus on the Judeo-Christian tradition as the religious tradition that has mostheavily influenced that development. W e would suggest thatmuch the same relationship exists between the Judeo-Christiantradition and the W estern legal system as Northrup Fryesuggested exists between the Bible and W estern literature. InWords With Power (M arkham: Penguin Books Canada Ltd.,1990) [Frye, Words]. Frye builds on ideas initially developed inThe Great Code: The Bible and Literature (Toronto: AcademicPress, 1982), arguing (Words, ibid. at xi) that “the structure ofthe Bible, as revealed by its narrative and imagery" has shapedthe "conventions and genres of W estern literature.” Of course,it is quite possible that future legal developments will reflect thegrowing religious pluralism of Canada. Second, where we giveexamples to elaborate on a particular point, these relateprimarily (although not exclusively) to Christianity because weare writing out of our own experiences and backgrounds. Thisis the only religious tradition in which we have worshipped andabout which we feel knowledgeable enough to comment in anydepth. However, we do not want to be misunderstood asmaking arguments only about religious discourse based onChristian beliefs. It is our position that spirituality continues tobe of importance for many individuals today; that for manysuch individuals, their religious beliefs undergird their politicalviews; and that explicit references to those beliefs is anappropriate part of public discourse. This position applies to allreligions, not just Christianity. As the homogeneity of Canada's
religious landscape is leavened by immigrants bringing deepreligious roots in a variety of different faith traditions, it seemslikely that the religious reasons relied on in public debates willmore and more reflect this diversity.   Our discussion draws primarily on American writings on this2 topic, and in particular Robert Audi & Nicholas W olterstorff,Religion in the Public Square (New York: Rowman &Littlefield, 1997) [Audi & W olterstorff].  There was a time in W estern society when religion played a far3 more overt role in shaping public policy and law than is thecase today. Duncan Forrester suggests that “in the past atheological approach, or at least an explicitly theologicaldimension to the discussion, was almost universal in westernpolitical thought . . . . The political significance of theology wasalmost universally assumed.” Christian Justice and PublicPolicy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 10.In the world of medieval Europe, for instance, it was thoughtnatural and inevitable that Christian theology would mouldsecular as well as ecclesiastic law, both in terms of how lawitself was conceptualized and in the specific content of the law.W hile the political significance of theology is no longeruniversally assumed, the law in Canada today still bears theimprint of that earlier time. In Law and Revolution: TheFormation of the Western Legal Tradition , Harold J. Bermanmakes a convincing argument that the “basic institutions,concepts, and values of W estern legal systems have theirsources in religious rituals, liturgies, and doctrines of theeleventh and twelfth centuries” (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1983) at 165 [Berman, Law and Revolution].According to Berman, reforms initiated by the Roman CatholicChurch in medieval Europe that are still foundational to ourlegal system include: the introduction of rational trialprocedures to replace magical mechanical modes of proof byordeals of fire and water, by battles of champions, and by ritualoaths; the insistence upon consent as the foundation of marriageand upon wrongful intent as the basis of crime and thedevelopment of equity to protect the poor and the helplessagainst the rich and the powerful and to enforce relations of
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Religion continues to be important to asignificant number of Canadians. In the 2001census, 16 percent of the population declaredthemselves as having no religion.  This means that4over 80 percent of Canadians consider themselvesto have some religious beliefs, whether this meansan affiliation to an established faith tradition orsimply a sense of the spirituality inherent in life.Various observers of today’s culture argue thatmany Canadians are in fact deeply interested inspiritual matters.  5
We would argue that, for many religiousbelievers, their faith (whatever that faith may be)is the lens through which they view any issue ofsignificance, including legal issues, and that thereare no convincing reasons to characterizereligious-based arguments as an illegitimate formof public discourse. It may be that explicitidentification of one’s religious views as thesource for one’s social values is less frequenttoday in the Western world (at least in part,
perhaps, because such discourse has beendelegitimized by some modern theorists). Itnevertheless seems logical and in fact inevitablethat, as long as religious beliefs persist, some6 individuals will want to make religious-basedarguments on matters of law and public policy. 
This should not be surprising, given the natureof religion and of law. Both involve a belief thatthere are right ways and wrong ways of living incommunity with others. Both involve some visionof what a “just society” or the “Kingdom of God”should look like – even if there is intensedisagreement within a society or within a religionas to the content of this vision. Therefore, formany people of faith, discerning the religiousdimension in questions of law and public policy isa vital part of determining their response to thosequestions. In fact, for anyone who sincerelybelieves that religious faith involves a journeytoward understanding and acting upon God’s will,how could the insights gained throughout thatjourney not affect one’s views on many issues oflegal and constitutional significance? And why, ifengaged in public deliberation on or justificationof those views, would one not articulate thoseinsights?  As Richard Moon notes: 7trust and confidence. See Harold J. Berman, Faith and Order:The Reconciliation of Law and Religion  (Atlanta: ScholarsPress, 1993) at 4. Other, less progressive examples can also befound. For instance, in the past, the restricted legal status ofwomen within marriage and the exclusion of women frompublic life were no doubt influenced in part by the dominantChristian theology of the day. We would note tangentially herethat a knowledge of (even if not necessarily a belief in) thebasic tenets of Judaism and Christianity will provide insightinto the historical development of Canada's laws. Presumablya knowledge of other religions would contribute to anunderstanding of other legal traditions. Thus, it seems likelythat studying the basic tenets of Hinduism might well berelevant to understanding how law developed in India;understanding Confucianism might well illuminate one'sunderstanding of law in China, at least until the time of theChinese Revolution.   Statistics Canada, ?Population by Religion, by Provinces and4 Territories,” 2001 Census, online: <http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/demo30a.htm>. There were significant regionalvariations, from a mere 2.5 percent of Newfoundlandersreporting themselves as being of no religion to 35 percent and37 percent in British Columbia and Yukon, respectively.  In his most recent book , Restless Gods: The Renaissance of5 Religion in Canada  (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co., 2002),sociologist Reginald Bibby states, “It's time we said it: when itcame to predicting the future of religion generally andChristianity specifically, Karl M arx, Emile Durkheim, andSigmund Freud were wrong. Societies and individuals have notceased to have a need for religion.” Quoted in Jim Coggins,“ N o  L o n g e r  I n t e r e s t e d ? ”  o n l i n e :  E n c o u n t e r<http://www.encountergod.com/20/interested.html>. In 1999,George Gallup stated: “There is a searching for spirituality anda hunger for God such as we have not seen in 65 years ofscientific polling.” Quoted in Dr. Ian Ritchie, “Spirituality onthe M arch,” online: <http://www3.sympatico.ca/ian.ritchie/Secularization.htm>.
  Karen Armstrong suggests:6 [H]uman beings are spiritual animals. Indeed, thereis a case for arguing that Homo sapiens is alsoHomo religiosus. Men and women started toworship gods as soon as they became recognisablyhuman; they created religions at the same time asthey created works of art. This was not simplybecause they wanted to propitiate powerful forcesbut these early faiths expressed the wonder andmystery that seems always to have been an essentialcomponent of the human experience of thisbeautiful yet terrifying world.  Like art, religion hasbeen an attempt to find meaning and value in life,despite the suffering that flesh is heir to. Like anyother human activity, religion can be abused but itseems to have been something that we have alwaysdone. It was not tacked on to a primordially secularnature by manipulative kings and priests but wasnatural to humanity. 
A History of God (London: Heinemann, 1993) at 3.    Issues that religious believers might see as particularly affected7 by their faith include: same-sex marriage (e.g., Halpern v.Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 225 D.L.R. (4 ) 529 (Ont.thCA), online: CanLII <http://canlii.org/on/cas/onca/2003/2003onca10102.html>); assisted suicide (e.g., Rodriguez v.British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519,on line: C anLII <h ttp://w w w .canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/1993/1993scc101.html>); abortion (e.g ., R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1S.C.R. 30, online: CanLII <http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/1988/1988scc2.html>); new genetic technologies (e.g., Harvard
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While we may seek to minimize directreligious conflict and confrontation inpublic life, we must also recognize thatreligious commitment has implications forhow adherents should live their lives inthe larger community and for the kind ofsociety they should work to create.8
Yet, the legitimacy of religious-baseddiscourse in the public square is far fromuniversally accepted by academic writers, and sowe move to the main focus of this article:responding to arguments that would exclude suchdiscourse from public policy discussion anddecision-making.  Before we do so, however, wepause to point out that we are not arguing thatreligious-based discourse will always move us in
the direction of justice and compassion.  Nor9would we think it persuasive for those who wouldexclude religious-based arguments from publicdiscussion to seek to justify their position bymaintaining that the influence of religion onsociety has been or will be consistently negative.
THE LEGITIMACY OF RELIGIOUSDISCOURSE IN THE PUBLIC SQUAREWe suggested above that as long as religiousbeliefs persist, some individuals will want to make religious-based arguments on matters of law andpublic policy. This being the case, are there validreasons for keeping such discourse out of thepublic square? As we examine the variousarguments that have been put forth for keepingpublic policy discussion secular,  it is our view10
College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R.45, 2002 SCC76, online: CanLII <http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/2002/2002scc76.html>); the prohibition ondiscrimination in human rights or constitutional law, as well aslegal exceptions to that prohibition; the extent to which oursystem of taxation should redistribute resources; whether thecriminal law should be aimed at retribution or rehabilitation;and how the secular law should apply to the ordering ofrelationships within a religious community or between thatcommunity and others in society.  This last issue encompassesa wide variety of questions. For instance, do human rights law,labour law, and administrative law apply to the hiring, terms ofemployment, or dismissal of clergy?  See, e.g.,, McCaw v.United Church of Canada  (1991), 4 O.R. 3d 481 (CA). Can areligious school impose religious-based requirements onstudents or teachers?  See, e.g., Vriend v. Alberta , [1998] 1S.C.R. 493, online: CanLII <http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/1998/1998scc30.html>; and Trinity Western University v.British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772,2001 SCC31, online: CanLII <http://canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/2001/2001scc31.html> [Trinity Western]. Can a school, whetherpublic or with religious affiliations, refuse, on religiousgrounds, to use certain texts as teaching materials or to havethose texts in the school library? See, e.g., Chamberlain v.Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710, 2002 SCC86, online: CanLII <http://www.org/ca/cas/scc/2002/2002scc86.html> [Chamberlain].  W hat happens when child welfarelaw conflicts with a religious community’s views on raisingchildren? Can parents refuse life-saving medical treatment fortheir child if the treatment is prohibited by their religiousbeliefs? See, e.g., R.B. v. C.A.S. of Metropolitan Toronto,[1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, online: CanLII <http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/1995/1995scc7. html>. How does the lawrespond if, on separation or divorce, parents are in disagreementas to the religious education of their children? See, generally,on these issues, M .H. Ogilvie, Religious Institutions and theLaw in Canada , 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003). On any oneof these issues, and myriad others, it would be difficult forpeople of faith to arrive at a conclusion without reference totheir religious beliefs.  Richard M oon, “Liberty, Neutrality and Inclusion: Religious8 Freedom Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”41 Brandeis Law Journal 563 at 573 [M oon]. 
  Thus, we would not join with Paul Horwitz, “The Sources and9 Limits of Freedom of Religion in a Liberal Democracy: Section2(a) and Beyond” (1996) 54 University of Toronto Faculty LawReview 1 [Horwitz], arguing that “religion is an intrinsic good”(at 55) or that “as an intuitive proposition it [the idea thatreligion is intrinsically good] is both clear and compelling.Even those who lack religious faith can understand the ineffableand invaluable quality of religious commitment” (at 56). W e donot take this position for at least two reasons. First, Horwitz'sassumption that this proposition is compelling seems doubtful;it is unlikely that those who have consciously discarded thereligious beliefs in which they were raised (and not replacedthese with another set of religious beliefs) would findarguments about the intrinsic good of religion to be compelling.Second, Horwitz's assumption seems insufficiently nuanced todeal with the variations among and complexities of the beliefs(and ensuing behaviours) that could be labeled “religious.”  W hile we respond in this paper to arguments advanced by10 secular thinkers as to why religion should be kept private andwhy the public square should be kept secular, it is only fair tonote that some religious believers would also argue that religionand politics do not mix; that spirituality means keeping one’seye firmly on the life to come or on one’s inner consciousness,rather than on the realities of everyday life. The fact that somebelievers may wish to limit their engagement with or withdrawfrom public life does not, however, end the discussion, sincethis is far from a universal characteristic of those with religiousbeliefs. There will always be those whose faith calls them intoaction in this world.  The prophetic role of faith has strong rootsin the Jewish and Christian traditions. It embodies anunderstanding of the “Kingdom of God” as something to beworked for here on earth, rather than simply anticipated eitherafter death or at the end of the world. Clearly too, a quest forsocial justice has strong roots in Islam.  It seems likely thatother faith communities also encompass a sense of thetransformative role of religion in civil society.  Perry suggeststhat: “Partly in consequence of mutually transformativeecumenical encounter and dialogue with one or more of thesemitic religions, Indic spiritualities–in particular, Hinduismand Buddhism–are retrieving from their margins their propheticresources.” Perry, Love and Power, supra  note 1 at 81[footnotes omitted].
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that, these arguments, whether taken separately orin combination with each other, are simply notconvincing.11
Arguments for keeping religious discussionseparate from public policy discussions arefounded on beliefs about the nature of a secularstate or, more specifically, the nature of liberaldemocracy.  Wolterstorff describes the liberal12position: “[C]itizens (and officials) are not to basetheir decisions and/or debates concerning politicalissues on their religious convictions.”  Of course,13
no one proposes that religious argument bycitizens in the public square should be illegal.14The thrust of the liberal position is that people offaith should voluntarily abstain from basing theirpublic policy decisions on religious grounds orfrom making religiously based arguments. This ismuch the position of Robert Audi, who argues that“[a]s advocates for laws and public policies . . .and especially for those that are coercive, virtuouscitizens will seek grounds of a kind that anyrational adult citizen can endorse as sufficient forthe purpose.”  John Rawls argues for the15exclusion of religious or other comprehensivephilosophies in favour of what he calls “publicreason” in discussing and deciding “constitutionalissues” and “matters of basic justice.”  Richard16Rorty sounds a note of urgency, stating that“[c]ontemporary liberal philosophers think that weshall not be able to keep a democratic politicalcommunity going unless the religious believersremain willing to trade privatization for aguarantee of religious liberty.”  17
  Those in favour of constraints on religious discourse in the11 public square include: Robert Audi, Religious Commitment andSecular Reason  (New York: Cambridge University Press,2000); Robert Audi, “The Place of Religious Argument in aFree and D emocratic Society” (1993) 30 San Diego LawReview 677; Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions andPolitical Choice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988)[Greenawalt, Religious Convictions]; Kent Greenawalt,“Grounds for Political Judgment: The Status of PersonalExperience and the Autonomy and Generality of Principles ofRestraint” (1993) 30 San Diego Law Review 647 [Greenawalt,“Grounds for Political Judgment”]; W illiam P. M arshall, “TheOther Side of Religion” (1993) 44 Hastings Law Journal 843;Suzanna Sherry, “The Sleep of Reason” (1996) 84 GeorgetownLaw Journal 453; and John Rawls, Political Liberalism (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1993) [Rawls]. Thosearguing against limits include: Larry Alexander, “Liberalism,Religion and the Unity of Epistemology” (1993) 30 San DiegoLaw Review 763 [Alexander]; Jonathan Chaplin, “BeyondLiberal Restraint: Defending Religiously-Based Arguments inLaw and Public Policy” (2000) 33 University of BritishColumbia Law Review 617 [Chaplin]; Frederick M . Gedicks,“Public Life and Hostility to Religion” (1992) 78 Virginia LawReview 671; Frederick M. Gedicks, “The Religious, theSecular, and the Antithetical” (1991) 20 Capital University LawReview 113 [Gedicks]; David Hollenbach, “Contexts of thePolitical Role of Religion: Civil Society and Culture” (1993) 30San Diego Law Review 877; M ichael W . M cConnell, “FiveReasons to Reject the Claim That Religious Arguments ShouldBe Excluded from Democratic Deliberation” (1999) Utah LawReview 639; Perry, Love and Power, supra  note 1; M ichael J.Perry, “Religious Morality and Political Choice: FurtherThoughts – and Second Thoughts – On Love and Power”(1993) 30 San Diego Law Review 703; Steven Shiffrin,“Propter Honoris Respectum: Religion and Democracy” (1999)74 Notre Dame Law Review 1631; and M ichael Walzer,“Drawing the Line: Religion and Politics” (1999) Utah LawReview 619. For an interesting debate on the issue, see Audi &W olterstorff, supra note 2.  Arguably, the wide acceptance of these arguments may also in12 some instances reflect lack of knowledge about religion, whichaccording to David Tracy, "is the single subject about whichmany intellectuals can feel free to be ignorant. Often abetted bythe churches, they need not study religion, for ‘everybody’already knows what religion is: It is a private consumer productthat some people seem to need. Its former social role waspoisonous. Its present privatization is harmless enough to wishit well from a civilized distance." Quoted in Perry, Love andPower, ibid. at 67.  Audi & W olterstorff, supra  note 2 at 73.  W hen referring to the13 “liberal position” we are referring to what M ichael J. Sandeldescribes as:
a version of liberalism prominent in the moral andlegal and political philosophy of the day. . . . Itscore thesis can be stated as follows: society, beingcomposed of a plurality of persons, each with hisown aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, isbest arranged when it is governed by principles thatdo not themselves presuppose any particularconception of the good; what justifies theseregulative principles above all is not that theymaximize the social welfare or otherw ise promotethe good, but rather that they conform to theconcept of right, a moral category given prior to thegood and independent of it.
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2d ed. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 1 [emphasis in original].  As Jonathan Chaplin suggests, “liberal democracies rarely, if14 ever, impose explicit constitutional or legal restraints onemploying [religious-based] arguments.” Therefore, Chaplinfocuses on the “moral and political legitimacy” accorded todifferent kinds of arguments. Supra  note 11 at 618.  Audi & W olterstorff, supra  note 2 at 17. W e would suggest that15 the reference to coercive laws and policies does not limit Audi’sposition greatly, since in the final analysis, all law would seemto contain a coercive element. On Audi’s and Rawls’descriptions of the virtuous citizen, W olterstorff makes therather caustic response: “No matter what principles of justice aparticular political theorist may propose, the reasonable thingfor her to expect, given any plausible understanding whatsoeverof ‘reasonable and rational,’ is not that all reasonable andrational citizens would accept those principles, but rather thatnot all of them would do so. It would be utterly unreasonablefor her to expect all of them to accept them.” Audi &W olterstorff, supra  note 2 at 99 [emphasis in original].  Rawls, supra  note 11 at 223-30.16  Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin17 Books, 1999) at 170-71 [Rorty]. Paul Horwitz, supra  note 9 at27-28, sees Rorty’s comments revealing “a defensiveness aboutthe future of the liberal project itself and the future of the state
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The liberal positions on this issue differ invarious ways.  Some argue for constraints on all18religious argument in the public square;  others,19like Rawls, would restrict religious argument onlywhen it is used to advocate or decide certainfundamental matters.  Still others would permitreligious argument, but only if the speaker iswilling and able to make the same point usingnon-religious argument.  Some argue for the20exclusion of religious arguments only; others forall arguments grounded in comprehensivephilosophies. What unites these positions is acommon belief that religious reasons should notbe relied upon when political issues are beingdecided in a liberal democracy.21
Proponents of exclusion argue that to allowreligious argument in the public square is divisiveor potentially divisive, and also in some wayunfair or disrespectful to those who do not sharethe religious belief. These reasons areunpersuasive. It also appears that the liberalposition is committed to an Enlightenmentepistemology that has been largely discredited inthe modern and postmodern world. In addition,public reason as conceived by Rawls and othersdoes not generate sufficient principles to resolvepublic policy debates. An appeal to fundamentalpresuppositions usually grounded in some
religious or comprehensive belief seemsinevitable.    
ARGUMENTS FOR EXCLUSION BASEDON ALLEGED DIVISIVENESSOne argument for excluding religiousargument is that it is divisive.    The issue of22whether religion is a beneficial or corrosive forcein society is much debated, and it will not likelyever be resolved. The debate turns as much on thehistorical facts as it does on one’s views aboutreligion. A fair conclusion is that religion’s impacthas been at times divisive, at times beneficial, attimes neutral. 
There are those who would argue that publicpolicy must be protected from religious influencebecause religious beliefs are inherently irrationalor repressive and would lead inevitably toirrational or repressive laws. Thus, Duncan B.Forrester suggests that “[t]here is a widespreadand deep-seated conviction in the modern westernacademy that religion is either a trivial or a malignfactor in political life.”  Certainly it is not23difficult to find numerous examples, whetherhistorical or present-day, where religion has beenused as an excuse for violence and oppression orwhere religious institutions have supported, or atleast not actively resisted, violent and oppressiveregimes or policies.  Others, though, would makethe opposite argument. Thus, Harold J. Bermansuggests that religion has influenced the law “inthe direction of greater humanity,”  and John von24Heyking argues that “[r]eligion helps liberal
. . . betray[ing] a view that beliefs and concepts that cannot beunderstood in a rational manner represent threats both to reasonand to its offspring, liberal democracy.”  Audi & W olterstorff, supra  note 2 at 72 and following.18  Jonathan C haplin labels this position as “classical secular19 liberalism,” and describes it as follows: “[R]eligiously-basedarguments, while legally permitted, are incompatible with therequirements of a liberal democratic political morality; virtuouscitizenship implies accepting the exclusion of religion from thepublic square and relying only on arguments which,supposedly, are equally accessible to all citizens – variouslytermed ‘public,’ ‘secular,’ ‘common,’ ‘reasonable,’ or‘rational.’ In a religiously pluralistic culture, such arguments bydefinition cannot be religiously-based.” Chaplin, supra  note 11at 626.   Chaplin (ibid. at 626-27) refers to this as the “inclusive” secular20 view. Under this view, “religiously-based arguments may quitefreely be used to support proposals regarding law or publicpolicy” but “only on the condition that, in addition to whateverreligiously-based arguments they [religious believers] may wishto advance, they must also  advance (or stand ready to advance)arguments which do not in any way depend on religious belief.It is these non-religious arguments which turn out to carry thenecessary public legitimacy in governing debate and especiallydecision; religiously-based arguments play, at best, a supportingpublic role” [emphasis in original].  Audi & W olterstorff, supra  note 2 at 75.21
  See, for example, William P. M arshall, “The Other Side of22 Religion” (1993) 44 Hastings Law Journal 843.       Forrester, supra  note 3 at 26. This conviction is sometimes used23 as a basis for arguing that religious- based discourse should beexcluded from the public square. This contention requires aresponse at two levels. First, it hardly seems acceptable to de-legitimize a particular kind of public debate simply because itmight be used by those whose politics we disagree with.Second, the underlying premise cannot be sustained. Thisbecomes very clear if we move from theory to how peopleactually debate social issues.  W hen we do so the role ofreligious belief on both sides of many contentious issuesbecomes obvious.  No religion is internally homogenous and inCanada religious pluralism is increased by the presence of anumber of different faith traditions.   Berman, Law and Revolution , supra  note 3 at 168.  24
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democracy at its weakest point by elevating itfrom its characteristic vices.”25
The plethora of examples on both sides of thisargument underscores the fact that even if we wereall agreed on a definition of the just society, therecould never be agreement as to whether theinfluence of religion has consistently moved uscloser to, or farther from, attaining that goal.Surely, this should hardly be surprising. Withinany religion there will be significant divergence asto what God’s will is and how this should betranslated into societal relationships. Given thespectrum of religious beliefs, there will beindividuals of faith making religious-basedarguments on both sides of almost any issue. Thus,for example, while it is accurate to point to thereligious inspiration behind the Americanabolitionist and civil rights movements,  at the26same points in history there were church-goerswho viewed slavery or segregation as reflectingGod’s ordering of the universe. 
Moreover, an important distinction can oftenbe drawn between a religious institution andindividual voices within it. Thus, in evaluating theresponse of the church to, for instance, theHolocaust, do we look at individuals such asDietrich Bonhoeffer, or at the stance of theCatholic and Lutheran churches as institutions inNazi Germany? Do we look at the words andactions of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, or of theChristian Reformed Church in apartheid SouthAfrica? Do we consider the work of LatinAmerican Archbishop Oscar Romero, or the moreconservative Roman Catholicism prevalent inLatin America? Nor can it be assumed that thechurch as institution will always take a moreconservative stance than individuals within theinstitution. The policy of the United Church ofCanada on gay and lesbian ordination and onsame-sex marriages is far less traditional than the
views of at least some of those in the pews. Noreligion is monolithic, and religion is far toovaried and complex to allow for any simplisticgeneralizations about how faith and politics willinteract. 
It is arbitrary and unprincipled to excludereligious argument because of its divisiveness.What beliefs are not potentially or actuallydivisive? It has become something of a stockargument to note the carnage of past religiouswars and to use that history as proof of religion’sdanger to a modern liberal democracy. In thetwentieth century, however, non-religious beliefsystems, often hostile to religion, such asMarxism, Communism, and Nazism led to thedeaths of hundreds of millions of people incountless wars and acts of genocide. One of themany lessons of the past century is that beliefs ofany kind have the potential to create discord.  
Almost any public policy issue, regardless ofthe terms on which it is discussed and debated, cangive rise to conflicts. Taxation, Aboriginal rights,the decriminalization of drugs, Québec indepen-dence, gun registration, etc., have each causedsocial friction and sometimes violence.Furthermore, this dissension can occur even whenthose on opposite sides do not make any explicitreferences to comprehensive value systems.Consider a hypothetical example: You and I mayboth believe in helping the less fortunate insociety, and each of us may ground our belief in anon-comprehensive philosophy. But there is ampleroom for serious disagreement between us on howto help the poor. Suppose that you support alaissez-faire, market-driven, corporate agenda; Ifavour interventionist economic strategies thatclosely regulate and constrain corporate policiesand also tax the rich heavily. My position flowsfrom a belief, supported by historical andsociological studies, about the relationshipbetween poverty and business corporations inNorth America. Yours is grounded in a devotionto a particular reading of Adam Smith and hismodern disciples, such as Milton Friedman.Neither of us makes any arguments grounded inreligious belief; indeed, we do not intend anappeal to any comprehensive philosophieswhatsoever.  Each supports our position witharguments we consider empirical, reasoned, andscientific. Nevertheless, this sort of disagreement
  John von Heyking, “The Harmonization of Heaven and Earth?:25 Religion, Politics, and Law in Canada” (2000) 33 University ofBritish Columbia Law Review 663 at 673.  Similarly, Horwitz(supra  note 9 at 55) argues for a recognition of the “intrinsicvalue of religion.” Our position would probably be more akinto Karen Armstrong's, who points out that religion has oftenbeen “cruel and coercive,” yet “[a]t its best (and only at its best)religion had helped people to cultivate an appreciation of theholiness of humanity.” The Battle for God  (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000) at 199-201.  Audi & W olterstorff, supra  note 2 at 80.26
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and argument has been exceptionally divisive inthe rich, Western world and has often led toviolence in the past few decades. One only has torecall the violence at the Québec Summit of theAmericas in April 2001 to realize that positions ofany kind, strongly held, can lead to division andsometimes civil unrest.27
Even if someone takes a position explicitlybased on religious beliefs, this does notnecessarily make it more divisive than argumentsbased on other comprehensive philosophies.   If anindividual makes an argument about a particularlaw or public policy, and links that argument tohis or her religious beliefs, some listeners willagree with the public policy stance but not withthe religious reasoning; others will disagree withthe speaker’s position on that particular issue butsee the references to religion as valid; a thirdgroup will agree with both aspects; and a fourthgroup will reject everything the speaker says.Does this make the reference to religionexclusionary or divisive? It is difficult to think ofsecular arguments, buttressed with reference to aparticular secular ideology, that would not meetthe same four-fold response. As Jonathan Chaplinhas pointed out, perspectives grounded in secularphilosophies do not enjoy anything close touniversal support and are frequently at odds witheach other on significant public policy issues.28
If certain sorts of arguments are going to beexcluded because they are divisive, it appears thatthe public square will be bereft of almost anyargument and debate, save for the most banalexchange of narrow platitudes. The liberalposition assumes an ideal society of citizens whoshare common political principles of sufficientrichness and complexity to address the thornypublic policy issues of the day. Unfortunately,someone relying solely on public reasons cannotresolve even the most basic policy debate. Assumeagreement on Rawls’ two fundamental liberal
principles of legitimacy.  For example, suppose29agreement on the principle of legitimacy that thegovernment should treat all persons as free andequal. How does that principle resolve an issuesuch as the distribution of resources withinsociety, given the various ways that wealth can bedistributed? Kent Greenawalt discusses the variousapproaches that could be used:
Among the most familiar are the Marxistformula, “From each according to hisabilities, to each according to his needs,”the utilitarian principle of maximizingaverage or total welfare, and thesuggestion of Rawls that distributionshould be equal except as inequality willincrease goods for representativemembers of the least advantagedeconomic group. In different respectseach of these views treats all citizens asequal.  For Marx, each’s needs countequally; for the utilitarian, each’s capacityfor happiness (or some surrogate) countsequally in the search for maximum overallwelfare; for Rawls, each’s entitlement toresources in a fundamental sense is equaland inequalities are allowed only ifeveryone is made better off.
A choice among these and other distrib-utive approaches will depend on someinitial premise about proper notions ofhuman equality and upon complexjudgments about human nature and actualor potential social relations.30
Rawls’ principles of legitimacy must beinformed at every turn by other more fundamentalassumptions about reality. This is another reasonwhy religious and other comprehensive
  V iolent chaos broke out in Québec City when protesters27 representing environmental, labour, and human rightsorganizations clashed with police while protesting the free tradetalks being held by representatives of numerous countries of theAmericas. The protesters opposed the Free Trade Area of theAmericas because of a belief that it would hurt the poor. See forinstance, “Summit of the Americas,” online: The Globe andMail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/serials/summit 2001/>.  Chaplin, supra note 11 at 640.  28
  Rawls’ two principles of justice are: Each person has an equal29 claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights andliberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme forall; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and onlythose liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. Social andeconomic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, theyare to be attached to positions and offices open to all underconditions of fair equality of opportunity, and second, they areto be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members ofsociety.  Supra  note 11 at 5-6.   Greenawalt, Religious Convictions, supra  note 11 at 17430 [footnotes omitted]; see also, Audi & W olterstorff, supra  note2 at 103.
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philosophies should not be, indeed cannot be,excluded from public discourse. They are oftenrelevant (and sometimes necessary) for theresolution of many issues of concern in a liberaldemocracy.   
Unless we believe that all arguments aboutwhat is right or wrong in a particular situation areeither completely arbitrary or completelymotivated by self-interest, then we have to acceptthat when people talk about various policy optionsas good or bad, they are measuring the optionsagainst a larger sense of right and wrong – in otherwords, against some sort of theory of justice,however incompletely expressed. Even those whoreject all religious beliefs would be hard pressed toarticulate a vision of justice without reference tosome underlying set of beliefs – whetherhumanism, feminism, Marxism, liberalism,conservatism, or libertarianism – that are alsobased on ultimately unverifiable assumptions, inthe same way as religious beliefs.  
The liberal position inevitably must espousethe truth of certain propositions, such as theequality of all people or the fundamental value ofhuman freedom. A religious person might espousethe importance of worshipping God. To argue forthe truth of these propositions both parties mustassert non-empirical presuppositions, beliefs aboutthe nature of reality. Even those who claim todisavow underlying foundational beliefs still seemto have fairly clear ideas about what kind ofsociety we should be trying to create – a conceptof the good that seems to be based on faithassumptions about how we should and should nottreat our fellow human beings.  As Moon argues,“At root, public debate and decision-making isabout issues of fundamental value.  Moreover, asmany others have pointed out, so-called secularvalues have a religious pedigree, and atranscendent or faith-based character.”  31
ARGUMENTS FOR EXCLUSION BASEDON ALLEGED UNFAIRNESS
Religious arguments are sometimes said to beunfair because they are inaccessible to those who
do not hold the religious belief.  Thus, Richard32Rorty claims that “[t]he main reason religionneeds to be privatized is that, in politicaldiscussion with those outside the relevant religiouscommunity, it is a conversation-stopper.”  But is33this really the case? Suppose someone argues infavour of protecting the environment because,according to the Book of Genesis, humanity isresponsible for safeguarding God’s creation, theearth. This is an argument from authority. Leavingaside the fact that these sorts of arguments areunlikely to be persuasive to someone who does notaccept the authority of the Bible, or this particularinterpretation of it, why is it unfair to someonewho does not share the same religious belief orany religious belief at all? Is it inaccessible to thatperson, and if so in what sense?  
It does not seem to be inaccessible, even tosomeone who does not accept the Bible asauthority. The appeal to the authority of Scriptureis no different than an appeal to any authority,religious or otherwise. It is an assertion that thesource of the knowledge is, in and of itself,grounds for accepting the argument, or at leastgrounds for giving it serious consideration.Arguments from authority are well-knownrhetorical strategies, common in discussion anddebate.   
Is the appeal to religious belief inaccessible inthe sense that it is incomprehensible? For someonewho has not read the first few chapters of Genesis,the meaning of the argument may be unknown butis surely not unknowable or incomprehensible.The Bible is available for reading and study toanyone, as are the Koran and other religious texts.The person making the argument could be askedto explain its meaning in non-religious language.Non-believers can be as knowledgeable aboutreligious arguments as believers, and often are.Someone who is unfamiliar with argumentsgrounded in supply-side economic theory, putforward by an economist who believes in thatparticular theory, is in the same position assomeone who is met with the argument thathumanity is the God-appointed steward of the
  Supra  note 8 at 573. 31
  See e.g., Kent Greenawalt, “Grounds for Political Judgment,”32 supra  note 11; and Abner S. Greene, “Is Religion Special?”(1994) University of Illinois Law Review 535.     Rorty, supra note 17 at 171.33
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earth. Each will, if they so choose, need to gain abetter understanding of the argument byfamiliarizing themselves with the appropriate textsor by asking questions.      
Are religious arguments incomprehensible inthe sense that a non-believer cannot understandthe basis for the belief – e.g., faith in God or faithin a religious text? While it may be true that thereis a sort of psychological separation or dividebetween a believer and a non-believer (thebeliever has faith in the particular thing or person,the non-believer does not), anyone can understandthe nature of faith in some sense because everyone(or seemingly everyone) has at least at one time oranother had faith in someone or something. Thenon-believer can therefore come to anunderstanding of a believer’s faith by analogy.34If, therefore, the substance of the belief is notinaccessible (e.g., humanity as stewards of God’sworld) and the faith basis of the belief isaccessible by analogy, it is hard to countenancethe argument that religious argument isinaccessible to the non-believer.35
Even if religious arguments are in some wayinaccessible, it does not follow that they shouldtherefore be excluded from the public square.There is always the possibility that the person whofinds the religious argument inaccessible will finda means of access or understanding, or if not, willsimply give the argument no weight, therebyeliciting and requiring alternative arguments. Such
is the nature of debate and discourse, even debateswhere religious arguments are excluded.  
ARGUMENTS FOR EXCLUSION BASEDON ALLEGED DISRESPECT
Is it disrespectful to support a politicaldecision for reasons that not all citizens accept asappropriate? A Buddhist, for example, mightsupport a particular environmental policy becauseher religious teachings tell her that all life issacred. Is the Buddhist being disrespectful to thosewho do not share and perhaps cannot comprehendthe basis for her political decision? A central claimof the liberal position is that citizens should not,out of respect for every citizen's freedom andequality, rely on reasons for their decisions theycould not expect these fellow citizens to endorse.If the environmental policy is given the force oflaw by the state, then some citizens are subject tothe coercive power of the state for reasons theyfind unacceptable.  Is this disrespectful? 36
 One response to this argument is to ask whatthe ethic of respect requires.  It is certainly not37self-evident that a citizen in such a situation hasbeen treated disrespectfully.   Nor is it self-evidentthat a liberal democracy requires that citizensrespect other citizens in this way. The liberalposition assumes a definition of respect that iscontested. By contrast, why should we not beginwith the assumption that it is disrespectful to askthe Buddhist to justify her decision on groundsacceptable to all citizens? Why privilege the ideaof public reasons? Wolterstorff wonders whetherappropriate respect is being paid in the followingsituation:
Suppose that you offer to me reasonsderived from your comprehensivestandpoint; and that I, fully persuaded ofthe moral impropriety of such behaviourby the advocates of the liberal position,brush your remarks aside with thecomment that in offering me suchreasons, you are not paying  due respectto my status as free and equal. Only if you
  The classic definition of faith in the Christian New Testament34 is found at Hebrews 11:1, where faith is described as “theconfidant assurance that what we hope for is going to happen.”M ark R. Norton, ed., Holy Bible, New Living Translation(W heaton, IL: Tyndale House, 1996).  In fact, we would suggest that, even for those who do not35 themselves subscribe to religious beliefs, a recognition of thereligious aspects of many social issues would seem to benecessary for those involved with politics or the law. By way ofexample, consider a case where parents have made a decisionto refuse conventional medical treatment for their ill child, andthat decision is being challenged by the state. Suppose theparents reject the premises underlying conventional W esternmedicine and are wholehearted disciples of some alternativeapproach to treatment. W hile it is certainly not necessary for thelawyers and the judge involved in the case (or for those craftinga legislative response to such a case) to embrace the samephilosophy of treatment, it seems obvious that they will bebetter able to represent the parents, respond to the parents’arguments, decide the case, or draft effective legislation if theyhave some understanding of (even if not agreement with) thepremises on which the parents based their decision.   Rawls, supra  note 11 at 217-18.36  Audi & W olterstorff, supra note 2 at 109.37
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offer me reasons derived from theindependent source [public reasons] willyou be paying me due respect. To offerme such reasons is to demean me; I willnot listen.  38
Is the adherent of the liberal position beingrespectful here? The ethic of respect may requirethat I listen to others in their particularity, andpermit them to make political decisions that aresupported by their particular beliefs, rather thanrequiring them to appeal to public reason.      39               A second response is to question the assertionthat political decisions are not legitimate whenbased on religious or other comprehensive beliefs.Many, perhaps most, citizens in a liberaldemocracy hold that political legitimacy issatisfied when, after a full and fair debate that wasopen to all citizens, a majority of citizens vote infavour of a policy or in favour of a governmentthat develops a particular policy.   This procedure40forms the bedrock of liberal democracies and tomost citizens is considered reasonable and fair.41It is a way of making political decisions thataccommodates and reflects the plural andmultifaceted nature of the citizenry in Westerndemocracies. It accords also with the very natureof discussion and debate, which inevitablyinvolves a clash of opposing and divergent pointsof view. Differences in political discussions, likedebate of any kind, usually turn not on adisagreement over facts or the logic of anargument, but on fundamental disagreement about
basic assumptions. Once the disputants havedetermined that neither has committed an error oflogic and each has a clear apprehension of thefacts, the debate must inevitably turn to basicassumptions if one side is to prevail in persuasionover the other. No one in this day and age shouldever expect to find widespread agreement overbasic assumptions. Pleas to limit arguments tothose with which any reasonable person couldagree assume the possibility of finding universallyheld positions and fail to recognize that the veryconcept of reasonableness is contested.  ARGUMENTS FOR EXCLUSIONRELATED TO CONSTITUTIONALCONCERNS  Another argument against the use of religiousarguments to justify political decisions takes aconstitutional form. It is two-pronged. It is saidthat the use of religious reasons to support publicpolicy is contrary to freedom from religion, and,further, that religious arguments that become lawrepresent the “establishment” of religion withinthe state.   42
Moon summarizes the relevant constitutionalprotection under the Canadian Charter of Rightsand Freedoms:
The Canadian Charter of Rights andFreedoms guarantees to all persons“freedom of conscience and religion.”The Charter, however, does not includeany  obvious equ iva len t to  theEstablishment Clause of the FirstAmendment of the United States Bill ofRights. According to the Canadian courts,s. 2(a), the freedom of religion provisionin the Charter, protects the individualfrom “coercion in matters of conscience.”It prohibits the state from either restrictingor compelling religious practice. But itdoes not necessarily preclude statesupport for religion. State support for thepractices or institutions of a particular
  Ibid. at 110.38  Ibid . at 111.39  W olterstorff suggests that only three sorts of constraints are40 needed for citizens engaged in public policy debates. Allarguments in the public square should be made with civility andrespect; all arguments must be conducted in accordance withthe rule of law; and arguments should be made to further thegoal of social and political justice, not out of self-interest orpersonal gain. Ibid. at 112, 113.   The one fairly recent addition to this conception of democracy41 is the recognition that decision making by majority vote may beunfair to groups in society who, because of historic andcontinuing marginalization, run the risk of rarely having theirviews, particularly on those issues most related to theirmarginalization, reflected by the majority. This recognition hasled to the development of certain protections through humanrights legislation and the Charter. This does not, however,negate the underlying premise that on any particular issue, somewithin the state will not agree with the position taken by themajority and yet if that position has been crystallized into law,they are just as subject to the coercive power of the state asanyone else.
  For a discussion of the s. 2(a) jurisprudence, see Horwitz, supra42  note 9.  He argues (at 6) that “the proper approach of the courtsand the state to religion should be both supportive andaccommodating.”
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religion will breach s. 2(a) only if itcoerces some members of the community,and interferes with their ability to practicetheir faith or compels them to practice thefavoured religion.  43
The Charter may render unconstitutional lawsthat adopt religious symbols as symbols of thestate, mandate prayer in schools, interfere with thepractice of religion, or prohibit certain activitiesfor a primarily religious reason.  Certainly, as44Moon concludes, “[t]he State should remainneutral on the issue of what is the true faith.  Itshould not prefer one religion over another.”45This is very different, however, from the questionof whether commitment to liberal democracyrequires one to eschew religious-based argumentson matters of public policy.  
Is it contrary to the Charter guarantee of“freedom of conscience and religion” for a citizento base decisions concerning public policy onreligious grounds? Clearly, the answer on thisquestion is no. There is no legal or constitutionalconstraint on the reasons she uses to justify herdecisions. There are, of course, constraints on howone may express that religious reasoning. In Rossv. New Brunswick School District No. 15,  the46Supreme Court of Canada held that the freedom ofan individual to express her religious beliefs is notunlimited “and is restricted by the right of othersto hold and to manifest beliefs and opinions oftheir own, and to be free from injury from theexercise of the freedom of religion of others.”47The Court concluded that “[i]n relation to freedomof religion, any religious belief that denigrates and
defames the religious beliefs of others erodes thevery basis of the guarantee in s. 2(a) – a basis thatguarantees that every individual is free to hold andto manifest the beliefs dictated by one’sconscience.”  Thus, while we argue that public48reliance upon religious reasoning should berecognized as legitimate, we also acknowledge(and in fact support) the constitutional constraintthat beliefs or values – whether religious orotherwise – are not to be expressed in ways thatdiminish others’ freedom of belief or thatdenigrate the essential humanity of others.   ARGUMENTS FOR EXCLUSION BASEDON EPISTEMOLOGICAL GROUNDS
It appears that the real weight ofconstitutional, philosophical, and other argumentsfor excluding religious-based arguments rests onepistemological grounds – on the assumption thata coherent and relevant distinction can be madebetween the secular world and the religious world.Thus, the liberal position assumes that it ispossible for a citizen to be “free from religion,”for religion and faith to operate in the privaterealm, and for reason or “non-religious values” tohold sway in the secular, public world. On thisview of the world, any incursion into the publicsquare of religious reasons or law based onrelig ious values is  im perm issib le  andinappropriate. 
 While it is certainly possible to be free not topractice religion and to create a public space freeof religious symbols and practices (and theCharter protects those rights), it is not possible forthe secular realm to be free of metaphysicalbeliefs, some of which are religious. As Bensonexplains:
The term “secular” has come to mean arealm that is neutral or, more precisely,“religion-free.”  Implicit in this religion-free neutrality is the notion that thesecular is a realm of facts distinct fromthe realm of faith. This understanding,
  Supra note 8 at 56343  See, for example, R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295,44 online: C anLII <http://w w w .canlii.org/ca/cas/scc/1985/1985scc15.html> [Big M ], regarding Sunday closing legislation.Yet, it should be noted that, in striking down a law that requiredstores to remain closed on Sunday, the Supreme Court ofCanada considered the impact of such laws not only on thosewho hold no religious beliefs but also on those whose religionshave as their holy day a day other than Sunday. As BenjaminBerger suggests, this indicates that “the Court [was] plainlymotivated by a pluralist vision of secularism” – a vision that didnot relegate religion to the sidelines. “The Limits of Belief:Freedom of Religion, Secularism, and the Liberal State” (2002)17 Canadian Journal of Law & Society 39 at 56. For anothercritical reading of Big M , see Horwitz, supra  note 9.  M oon, supra  note 8 at 573. 45  [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, online: CanLII <http://www.canlii.org/ca/46 cas/scc/1996/1996scc35.html> [Ross].  Ross, ibid. at para. 72.47
  Ibid. at para. 94. For a discussion of this issue, see David M .48 Brown, “Freedom From or Freedom For: Religion as a CaseStudy in Defining the Content of Charter Rights” (2000) 33University of British Columbia Law Review 551 at 599.
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however, is in error. . . .  States cannot beneutral towards metaphysical claims.Their very inaction towards certain claimsoperates as an affirmation of others.  Thisrealization of the faith-based nature of alldecisions will be important as the courtsseek to give meaning to terms such assecular in statutes written some timeago.     49
On this issue, it is relevant to consider a recentdecision of the Supreme Court of Canada,Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36.50Chamberlain involved judicial review of adecision of a school board to prohibit three bookson same-sex parenting from being used in theclassroom. This prohibition was clearly based onthe religious beliefs of the school board members.The relevant legislation  required school boards51to act in a “secular” and “non-sectarian” fashion.The majority of the Supreme Court of Canadafound the school board's decision unreasonableand remanded the issue of whether the booksshould be approved to the board. The Court notedthat in light of the legislation, “the school boardmust consider the interests of all its constituentsand not permit itself to act as the proxy of aparticular religious view held by some members ofthe community, even if that group holds themajority of seats on the board.”   However, the52Court was very clear that: [t]he Act's insistence on strict secularismdoes not mean that religious concernshave no place in the deliberations anddecisions of the Board. Board membersare entitled, and indeed required, to bringthe views of the parents and communitiesthey represent to the deliberation process.Because religion plays an important rolein the life of many communities, theseviews will often be motivated by religiousconcerns. Religion is an integral aspect of
people's lives, and cannot be left at theboardroom door. What secularism doesrule out, however, is any attempt to usethe religious views of one part of thecommunity to exclude from considerationthe values of other members of thecommunity. A requirement of secularismimplies that, although the Board is indeedfree to address the religious concerns ofparents, it must be sure to do so in amanner that gives equal recognition andrespect to other members of thecommunity.53
This statement suggests that the Supreme Court ofCanada is developing a nuanced understanding ofthe concept of “secular,” which legitimates, butdoes not privilege, arguments based on religiousbelief.
In another recent case, Trinity WesternUniversity v. British Columbia College ofTeachers,  the Supreme Court of Canada54recognized that religious values are interwoven inthe fabric of Canadian society, and it implicitlyrejected a simplistic separation or division of thesecular and the religious. Trinity Western involvedjudicial review of a decision of the B.C. Collegeof Teachers. The College had refused TrinityWestern University certification for its teachereducation program because students were requiredto sign a ”community standards” documentagreeing to refrain from various “un-Biblical”behaviours, including homosexuality. In thecourse of its discussion, the majority of theSupreme Court of Canada commented: “Thediversity of Canadian society is partly reflected inthe multiple religious organizations that mark thesocietal landscape and this diversity of viewsshould be respected.”55 It is useful to situate this discussion in thebroader historical and philosophical context. Theperiod of the Enlightenment exposed andexacerbated a developing rift between science andre l ig ion . “The fundam en tal ax iom  o f  Iain T. Benson, “Notes Towards a (Re)definition of the49 ‘Secular’” (2000) 33 University of British Columbia LawReview 519 at 520. On this issue of the definition of the termsecular and its relationship to religious belief, see also Chaplin,supra  note 11; von Heyking, supra  note 25; and Berger, supranote 44.   Chamberlain , supra  note 7. 50  School Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 412, as amended, s. 76.51  Chamberlain , supra  note 7 at para. 27.52
  Ibid. at para. 19. For a discussion of the approach taken by the53 lower courts in Chamberlain , see Berger, supra  note 44. Seealso Brown, supra  note 48.   Trinity Western , supra  note 7.54  Ibid. at para. 33.55
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Enlightenment thought was that the world couldbe understood through the objective application ofreason and science once the distorting influence ofreligious ideologies was overcome.”   Over the56years, the secular became the domain of reasonand objective truth, publicly verifiable; religionwas relegated to the margins of individual belief,either unprovable or untrue.  
A critical assumption of the liberal position onthe issue of religious discourse in the publicsquare is that a form of human reason exists thatenjoys a different epistemological basis – asuperior grounding in truth – than religious belief,which therefore justifies the exclusion of religiousargument from the public square. Rawls’ positionis typical of the liberal position because he appearsto rely on a conception of human reason in theLockean Enlightenment sense, a reason thatsomehow transcends human experience and that,functioning properly, will lead to agreement andconsensus on fundamental matters.  The liberal57epistemology is at odds with the postmodernperspective, which, as described by RichardTarnas, reflects an “appreciation of themultidimensional nature of reality, the many-sidedness of the human spirit and the multivalent,symbolically mediated nature of humanknowledge and experience.”   58
In Chamberlain, the Supreme Court of Canadaappeared to recognize that almost all argumentsthat are made for or against a particular publicpolicy are likely to be rooted in a larger complex
of values and beliefs. Elaine Pagels notes, forexample, that divergent conceptions about theproper role of the state can often be traced todifferent assumptions about human nature.  These59assumptions may inform our religious discourse(God made humanity good according to thecreation myth in the Book of Genesis; orconversely, humanity is flawed, according to adifferent interpretation of the same text). Or thesefundamental assumptions may inform other formsof discourse, such as political philosophy(followers of Rousseau see natural humangoodness corrupted by society; other traditionsfollowing philosophers such as Hobbes advocatesocietal structure to constrain human impulses,which they believe tend to disorder and chaoswhen unfettered).60
A fundamental assumption about humannature (or whether there is such a thing as humannature) is beyond conclusive empirical proof. Wemay hold these sorts of beliefs or assumptions fora variety of reasons: our psychological makeup;what our parents taught us; what we learned inchurch, synagogue, mosque, or temple;  ourunique life experience; etc. Nevertheless, theseassumptions affect how each of us understandsand explains the world; these beliefs inform whatwe call human reason. These beliefs andassumptions are interwoven both into the fabric ofthe individual citizen and the fabric of Canadiansociety. The Supreme Court of Canada noted inTrinity Western that the diversity of Canadiansociety is “partly reflected” in its religiousorganizations. We would add also in its citizenswho hold religious beliefs. It has always has beenimpossible to separate religious belief and secularreason, because “our common human reason isalways a programmed human reason; what wecome to believe by the use of our reason(whatever Rawls might have in mind by that) is a
  Frederick Gedicks, “The Religious, the Secular and the56 Antithetical.” Supra  note 11 at 127.  As Larry Alexander writes: “The liberal’s rejection of religious-57 based policies suggests some sort of epistemological divide ordiscontinuity between what we can claim justifiably to knowsecularly so to speak, and what we can claim justifiably toknow religiously, the latter being an inferior form of knowledgefor purposes of public policy.” Supra  note 11 at 774. The liberalposition would appear to reflect what Perry (Love and Power,supra  note 1 at 57) describes as the “correspondence” theory ofrationality, according to which the truth of a statement or beliefcan be ascertained by determining how closely it correspondsto “unmediated reality.” Supra  note 1 at 57. In rejecting thisapproach, Hilary Putnam has stated, “If one must usemetaphorical language, then let the metaphor be this: the mindand the world jointly make up the mind and the world,” quotedin Perry, ibid. at 59. See also Audi & W olterstorff (supra  note2 at 96 and following)  for a short critique of Rawls on thispoint.  R ichard  Tarnas, The  Passion o f the W estern  M ind:58 Understanding the Ideas That Have Shaped Our World View(New York: Ballantine Books, 1991) at 407.
  See the transcript of Bill M oyers’ interview with Pagels in Bill59 M oyers, A World of Ideas (New York: Doubleday, 1989) at377.   Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, ed. by Susan60 Dunn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); and ThomasHobbes, Leviathan  (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1946). Also see R.S.Peters’ article on Rousseau in Paul Edwards, ed., Encyclopediaof Philosophy, Vol. 7  (New York: M acmillan Publishing & TheFree Press, 1972) 218;  Ronald Grimsley’s article on Hobbes inibid ., Vol. 4, 30; and Michael Levin, “Social Contract” in PhilipP. W einer, ed.,  Dictionary of the Hisotry of Ideas, Vol. 4 (NewYork: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1973) 251.
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function, in part, of what we already believe. Andwe differ in our belief – differ in particular, now,in our comprehensive perspectives.”         61CONCLUSION
The modern Western liberal democracythrives on a diversity of ideas and vigorous debate.We agree with Veit Bader that rather thanprohibiting certain sources of public discourse “weshould try to tell the ‘whole truth’ as we see it onwhatever topic and whenever it makes sense,accept that others do the same on an equal footing,tell it in understandable language, and discuss it ina civilized way.”62
The “whole truth” for many citizens cannot betold without an appeal to their religious beliefs.This is hardly surprising, given that thefundamental values of the Western legal traditionare firmly rooted in religious doctrines of pastcenturies. And, of course, the fact that many, if notmost, citizens in Canada and the West are stillcommitted in various ways to a religion makes itinevitable that these beliefs would inform theirsocial and political discussions. Issues such assame-sex marriage and the right to die have, formany people, important religious dimensions.Anyone who wants to fully participate in adiscussion of these issues must thereforeunderstand this religious dimension. Rather thantry to exclude religious argument from the publicsquare, we should welcome a rich diversity ofideas from a multitude of different perspectives. 
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